



EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION

Brussels, XXX  
[...] (2024) XXX draft

**COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) .../...**

**of XXX**

**amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the composition of the risk groups**

*This draft has not been adopted or endorsed by the European Commission. Any views expressed are the preliminary views of the Commission services and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the Commission.*

## **EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**

### **1. CONTEXT OF THE DELEGATED ACT**

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (“Regulation”)<sup>1</sup> sets up a security of gas supply mechanism in the Union that is based on the notion of identifying and anticipating risks (“risk-based approach”). Once the risks have been identified and assessed at regional and national level, the next step for Member States is to take appropriate preventive measures to reduce the likelihood that risks happen, as well as to foresee emergency measures that, in case of a gas supply disruption, will allow to minimize or remove its effects. These measures are to be described in national Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans (“National Plans”).

Regional cooperation, in a spirit of solidarity, is a guiding principle of the Regulation. Assessing correlated risks jointly, at regional level, makes the risk assessment more comprehensive and more precise, and ensures that Member States are better prepared for any crisis. Moreover, in an emergency, a coordinated and pre-agreed approach to the security of supply ensures a consistent response, optimises resources, makes measures more effective and reduces the risk of negative spill-over effects that purely national measures could have in neighbouring Member States.

To structure the preparation of joint risk assessments and facilitate regional cooperation, Annex I of the Regulation established thirteen regional risk groups, separated into four regional categories: Eastern, North Sea, North African and South-East. These risk groups were considered the basis for enhanced regional cooperation to enable agreement on appropriate and effective cross-border measures of all Member States concerned within the risk groups or outside the risk groups along the emergency supply corridors.

The risk groups reflect the major transnational risks to the security of gas supply in the Union; their composition is based on the main gas supply sources and routes. Each risk group includes those Member States along a corridor that may play a strategic role in case of gas supply crisis. Under Article 3(8) of the Regulation, the Commission is empowered to update the composition of the risk groups to reflect the evolution of the main transnational risks.

Article 7(2) of the Regulation requires Member States within each risk group to assess jointly all relevant risk factors such as natural disasters, technological, commercial, social, political and other risks that could lead to the materialisation of the major transnational risk to the security of supply for which the risk group was created (“common risk assessment”).

In order to make the regional cooperation feasible, Article 7(2) requires Member States to agree on a cooperation mechanism within each risk group. This mechanism has to be developed sufficiently in time to allow for conducting the common risk assessment and discussing and agreeing on appropriate and effective cross-border measures, which will require the agreement of each Member State concerned and that have to be included in the regional chapters of the national plans.

As foreseen in Article 7(1) of the Regulation, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) carried out in 2017, for the first time, a Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios. The simulation identified and assessed the emergency gas supply corridors and identified which Member States can address

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1.

identified risks. The gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios and the methodology for the simulation were defined by ENTSOG in cooperation with the Gas Coordination Group (“GCG”).

ENTSOG’s first Union-wide simulation considered the gas infrastructures that were in operation along the different gas corridors on 1 October 2017. This first Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios was the starting point for the preparation of the first “common risk assessments” within each risk group and of the national risk assessments, which were finalised by most Member States in 2019 and 2020. Those risk assessments, in turn, represented the basis for the preventive and emergency measures described in the national plans (also finalised by most Member States in 2019 and 2020).

In October 2020, upon request of the GCG, ENTSOG produced an *addendum* to the Union-wide simulation, in order to consider the security of supply impact of several major infrastructures that had been commissioned in the meantime across the Union. The *addendum* simulated again three disruption scenarios to take account of investments that had been commissioned in 2019: the “Baltic Connector”, connecting Finland and Estonia, and new gas import capacity from Russia via Turkey (“TurkStream2”) to Bulgaria.

Under the Regulation, the cycle Union-wide “simulation / common risk assessments / national risk assessments / national plans” has to be reviewed every four years.

The methodology and assumptions for ENTSOG’s Union-wide simulation, finalised in November 2021, remained largely the same as applied in the first simulation. However, learning from the experience, the revised Union-wide simulation considered those projects that were expected to be in operation in January 2023. In this way, the simulation reflected as much as possible the configuration of the emergency gas corridors foreseen at the time of application of the updated national plans due in March 2023.

As a matter of consequence, the composition of some risk groups, as defined in Annex I of the Regulation, was modified in 2021 by the first Delegated Act in line with Article 3(8) of the Regulation for which the Commission is empowered to revise the composition of the risk groups<sup>2</sup>. This update was to translate the evolution of the main transnational risks to reflect the role that some additional Member States may have along certain supply corridors and to allow these countries to contribute to the common risk assessments of these risk groups and to the joint definition of regional preventive and emergency measures. Furthermore, the United Kingdom ceased to be a Member State of the European Union as from 1 February 2020. As a matter of legal certainty, it was removed from the lists of Member States in Annex I.

After the date of entering into force of the Delegated Regulation in November 2021, several events occurred and impacted the gas security of supply in the Union. Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and its attempted weaponisation of Europe’s energy supply has completely changed the geopolitical context strongly affecting gas security of supply in the Union by causing unilateral supply cuts from Russia in the first half of 2022. It highlighted the Union’s over-dependence on a single, unreliable supplier for almost half of its gas imports.

In May 2022, the European Commission adopted the REPowerEU Plan<sup>3</sup> taking a range of actions to eliminate its reliance on Russian fossil fuel imports by saving energy, diversifying

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<sup>2</sup> COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2021/7797 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the composition of the risk groups [EUR-Lex - C\(2021\)7797 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>3</sup> [EUR-Lex - 52022DC0230 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

supplies and accelerating the roll-out of renewable energy production in Europe. Furthermore, on 26 September 2022, four explosions occurred at the Nord Stream 1 and 2 underwater natural gas pipelines linking Russia and Germany, rendering three of the four lines inoperable. As their inoperability is still in place, currently there is no transnational risk attached to it.

As a result, Russian gas imports have been to a large extent replaced by supplies from alternative suppliers in the form of additional pipeline import from trusted partners and, above all, a considerable increase in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports (50 bcm, or a 73% increase in 2022 year-on-year). Whereas Russian imports amounted to around 50% of the EU's pipeline imports before the war, they represent now less than 10%, showcasing the unprecedented shift the EU's gas system has undergone in the past years.

As already highlighted in the Commission Report adopted in October 2023 on reviewing the application of the Regulation<sup>4</sup>, the current regional approach to the risk groups seems no longer fit for purpose, given the changed geopolitical landscape, the risen prominence of LNG and the reduced role of some of the pipeline supply corridors.

The methodology and assumptions for the new ENTSOG's Union-wide simulation, as finalised in December 2024, remain largely the same as applied in the last simulation even with some substantial changes, considering that the European gas transmission grid and market situation evolved significantly in comparison to the 2021 situation. ENTSOG indeed considers no pipe supply from Russia in either of its scenarios and its sensitivity analyses reflect various LNG supply potentials instead.

In addition to the above considerations, in the spirit of required simplification and following up on the audit on gas security of supply carried out by the Court of Auditors and finalized in the Report<sup>5</sup> adopted in June 2024, the Commission has reviewed the current structure of regional cooperation by: (a) adapting the configuration to changed circumstances such as the increased weight of LNG and the reduced role of certain pipeline supply corridors; (b) reducing overlaps between risk groups, clarifying roles and responsibilities.

## **2. CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE ACT**

The GCG<sup>6</sup> was established by Article 4 of the Regulation to facilitate the coordination of measures concerning the security of gas supply. It is composed of representatives of the Member States, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), ENTSOG and representative bodies of the gas industry and of relevant consumers.<sup>7</sup>

Under Article 4(4) of the Regulation, the Commission may convene the GCG in a setting that is restricted to the representatives of the Member States.

The impact of new infrastructure on the existing emergency supply corridors considered in Annex I was discussed at three ordinary meetings of the GCG in 2024, in the context of the discussions about ENTSOG's 2024 Union-wide simulation of supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios.

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<sup>4</sup> [EUR-Lex - 52023DC0572 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Special report 09/2024: Security of the supply of gas in the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>6</sup> Expert group register number X01096.

<sup>7</sup> The expert group was first created in 2006; the current composition results from Commission Decision of 11 August 2011 establishing the composition and the operational provisions of the Gas Coordination Group and repealing Commission Decision 2006/791/EC, OJ C 236, 12.8.2011, p. 10.

The methodology and assumptions for ENTSG's 2024 Union-wide simulation were presented and discussed at an ordinary GCG meeting on 19 June 2024. Among other methodology aspects, the discussions addressed the inclusion in the simulation of infrastructure expected to be commissioned in 2025, and the impact of this choice on the composition of the risk groups. The Commission's services presented the procedure and estimated timeline for updating the risk groups. After the meeting, a two-week-period was open for GCG to comment in writing.<sup>8</sup>

The GCG received the draft update of the risk groups by e-mail on 8 October 2024<sup>9</sup>, together with the invitation to a restricted GCG meeting.

A four-week-period was open for public feedback on \_\_\_\_\_ until \_\_\_\_\_. Comments were generally supportive of the intended changes.<sup>10</sup>

A meeting of the GCG, restricted to Member States' representatives and ENTSG (as observer), was held on \_\_\_\_\_ by webconference.

The Commission took note of comments from \_\_\_\_\_ recorded in the minutes of the meeting, and concluded that there was general support to the draft Delegated Regulation.

The European Parliament and the Council were informed of the meetings of the GCG where this draft delegated act was discussed and both institutions, therefore, received all relevant documents at the same time as Member States' experts, in line with the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law Making and the Common understanding on Delegated Acts annexed to it.

### 3. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE DELEGATED ACT

Article 3(8) of the Regulation empowers the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 19 ("Exercise of the delegation") in order to update the composition of the risk groups set out in Annex I, by amending this annex in order to reflect the evolution of the major transnational risks to the security of gas supply in the Union and its impact on Member States, taking into account the result of the Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios carried out by ENTSG in accordance with Article 7(1). Before proceeding to the update, the Commission shall consult the GCG in the setting provided for in Article 4(4) of the Regulation on the draft update.

The purpose of this Delegated Regulation is to amend Annex I of the Regulation by reducing the number of the regional risk groups and setting up an updated structure taking into account the changed gas import infrastructure, the impact that new LNG terminals and infrastructure are having on the gas flows within the relevant emergency gas corridors, as defined in Annex I, the heavy administrative burden stemming from the high number of risk groups, as well as the potential contribution of Member States in case of supply disruptions, as explained in the following paragraphs.

Annex I of the Regulation established thirteen regional risk groups, separated into four regional categories, as based from the different origins of gas sources: Eastern, North Sea, North African and South-East.

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<sup>8</sup> Three Member States sent comments in writing.

<sup>9</sup> Attached to an e-mail informing the Energy Attachés of the Permanent Representations at the European Union about the upcoming restricted GCG meeting and inviting them to appoint delegates. Member States' usual GCG delegates were in cc to the e-mail.

<sup>10</sup> XX contributions, from X citizen and X industry associations.

In response to the energy crisis that started in 2022, the Union has been carrying out a number of actions to phase out Russian gas. As a result, while Russian imports amounted to around 50% of the EU's pipeline imports before the crisis, they currently represent less than 10%, showcasing the unprecedented shift the EU's gas system has undergone in the past year. In this context, Eastern gas supply risk groups (point 1. of Annex I), which include Member States in Central and Eastern Europe relying on Russian gas supplies via different routes, are largely not operational anymore.

The situation called for a rethinking of the status-quo on the EU energy market. A combination of more reliable pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports were crucial to overcoming the EU's dependency on Russian gas imports. As a result, Norway and the US became the main gas suppliers in 2023, representing 30% and 19% of the total gas imports to the EU, respectively.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported to Europe through LNG terminals is the source of diversification that contributes to competition in the gas market and security of supply. New LNG supplies from North America, Australia, Qatar, and East Africa are increasing the size of the global LNG market, and these volumes have already reached the European market.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and its weaponisation of Europe's energy supply, the share of Russian pipeline gas in total EU energy imports has fallen dramatically from 41% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. This has been replaced mainly by LNG from the US, which supplied 46% of EU LNG imports in 2023 and reliable pipeline gas imports from Norway (49% compared to 30% in 2021), North-Africa (19%) and Azerbaijan (7%).

The Union has steadily increased its LNG import capacities by developing new LNG regasification and port terminals and building a liquid gas market which provides robust resilience to possible supply interruptions from the remaining Russian pipeline imports. The EU's LNG import capacity grew by 70 bcm in 2023-2024 and an additional 60 bcm is expected to become operational between 2025-2030.

In a spirit of simplification and rationalisation, the 2024 Commission Work Programme<sup>11</sup>, as adopted in October 2023, put forward additional simplification proposals in a range of policy areas, without lowering social, safety, consumer protection, environmental or economic standards. The envisaged simplifications are to streamline reporting requirements that are of limited use, for example by merging overlapping obligations, reducing the number of businesses concerned and increasing digitalisation. In this context, there is the need to rationalize and simplify the overall structure of the regional cooperation among all risk groups set up by Annex I of the Regulation.

This need is confirmed by Member States having encountered several difficulties in the previous years when developing the Common Risk Assessments (CRAs) in all the risk groups. The fact that some regional risk groups did not produce all the information needed for the national plans raises questions about the added value of their work. The Commission acknowledged that emergency plans in particular lacked regionally agreed measures for confronting regional crises and, more generally, a sufficient regional dimension. The Commission also recognized that long-lasting disruptions could still lead to a risk of uncoordinated action by Member States, threatening to endanger security of supply in their neighbouring EU countries.

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<sup>11</sup> [EUR-Lex - 52023DC0638 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)



The proposed Delegated Regulation is also taking into consideration the Court of Auditors Recommendation<sup>12</sup> to review the current structure of regional cooperation by: (a) adapting the configuration to changed circumstances, such as the increased weight of LNG and the reduced role of certain pipeline supply corridors; (b) reducing overlaps between risk groups, clarifying roles and responsibilities.

The above impacts on gas security of supply in the Union of the previous years justify the following changes on the structure of regional cooperation among Member States within the risk groups.

Concerning the Eastern gas supply risk groups (point 1. of Annex I), it is reasonable not to keep them given the change in their major supply infrastructure, such as the development of LNG infrastructure and the drastic reduction of Russian gas supplies to the region. This translates in a significant overlap with the North Sea risk group.

Global LNG supply is expected to continue to rise in the coming years, driven by increases in production and liquefaction capacities in LNG exporting countries. This justifies the establishment of a new “LNG” risk group which would include all Member States given the impact even on landlocked countries and the increasing importance of island countries.

As regard the North Sea gas supply risk groups (point 2. of Annex I), due to improved interconnectivity between them and the changing flow patterns it is more pragmatic to group them in one main risk group including Austria, Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland but excluding Portugal, Spain and Italy as these three Member States do not receive gas from the North Sea and are more largely relying on LNG and gas from Azerbaijan and Northern Africa.

As for North African gas supply risk groups (point 3. of Annex I), it is pragmatic to group all risk groups in one main regional risk group by excluding Croatia and Greece, as these two countries have strengthened the role of LNG in their imports and do not rely directly on pipeline imports from North Africa.

With the same approach, as the countries of this groups rely on the same import routes and due to increased interconnectivity, new infrastructure and in a spirit of simplification, it is timely to group the South-East gas supply risk groups (point 4. of Annex I) in one main regional risk group while keeping in the members of these risk groups.

These changes in the composition of risk groups are expected to have significant and positive implications on the security of gas supply in the Union and on the related work to be carried out by Member States. These changes will reflect the new actual reality in terms of gas infrastructures, gas flows and consequently joint risks among Member States and their related ability to support each other in case of gas disruptions. This will be reflected then in the revised regional cooperation mechanisms, while Member States contribution will help to improve the quality and accuracy of the common risk assessments. The reduced number of the regional risk groups will reduce administrative burden for Member States, while ensuring more focused and better preparedness. The revised common risk assessments (due by October 2026) will be adapted to the new gas infrastructure and market situation. This will benefit the national risk assessments and will provide a sound basis for the preparation of the national plans, which are due to be notified to the Commission in March 2027.

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<sup>12</sup> [Special report 09/2024: Security of the supply of gas in the EU | European Court of Auditors \(europa.eu\)](https://european-court-of-auditors.europa.eu/en/special-reports/special-report-09-2024-security-of-the-supply-of-gas-in-the-eu)

The act is within the scope of the delegated powers provided to the Commission by Article 3(8) and Article 19 of the Regulation and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the purpose of those provisions.

This delegated act is amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 by replacing its Annex I and it is appropriate, therefore, to proceed with a Delegated Regulation.

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# COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) .../...

of **XXX**

## amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the composition of the risk groups

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010<sup>13</sup>, and in particular Article 3(8) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) Regional cooperation, in a spirit of solidarity, is a core principle on which the security of gas supply mechanism established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is based on. In order to make regional cooperation operational in practice, Annex I to that Regulation, as replaced by the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/7797 of 18 November 2021 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the composition of the risk groups<sup>14</sup>,

identifies thirteen risk groups corresponding to four main emergency gas supply corridors. For each risk group, Annex I lists the Member States that may be affected or play a role, or both, in case of supply disruption along the corridor.

- (2) Since the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/7797 of 18 November 2021 several events occurred and impacted the gas security of supply in the Union, such as Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. New gas infrastructures have entered into operation and several further new pieces of infrastructure are expected to be commissioned in the following months. Those additional infrastructures, including new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, impact the gas flows within the relevant emergency gas corridors and strengthen the resilience of the EU gas system in the event of potential disruptions.
- (3) Under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) carried out a revised Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios in December 2024<sup>15</sup>. This simulation took into account the evolution of the Union gas infrastructures since 2017 and its impact on the different emergency gas supply corridors.
- (4) The impact of the new and upcoming gas infrastructures on the emergency gas corridors, the increased weight of LNG and the reduced role of certain pipeline supply corridors, as reflected in ENTSOG's Union-wide simulations, justify a reduction of the number of the regional risk groups and a change in their composition, also in a

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<sup>13</sup> OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> OJ L 104, 1.4.2022, p. 53–55.

<sup>15</sup> [ENTSOG Union Wide Security of Supply Simulation Report, January 2025](#).

spirit of simplification and rationalisation of the current structure of regional cooperation..

(5) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should therefore be amended accordingly.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

*Article 1*

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Regulation.

*Article 2*

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

*For the Commission*  
*The President*  
*Ursula VON DER LEYEN*